Peace agreements form a crucial element of strategies to bring security from outside: they involve third-party mediators during the negotiation stage and often peacekeeping troops to guarantee the agreement at an implementation stage. Peace roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. This paper reviews parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. The ambiva- ), Liberia (1994 -2003 ) und Zentralafrikanische Republik (1996. Die Schlussbemerkung konzentriert sich auf Faktoren für das Scheitern von Friedensabkommen, die Elemente der Machtteilung stark hervorgehoben hatten.
side powers may be at work when designing a peace agreement. At the same time, peace roundtables usually involve top politicians and military leaders, who negotiate, sign, and/or benefit from the agreement. What is usually and conspicuously absent from peace negotiations is broad-based participation by those who should benefit in the first place: citizens. More specifically, the local level of security provision and insecurity production is rarely taken into account. This paper first presents parts of the academic debate on power sharing and war termination, touching on some key findings by the main researchers working on the topic. Those findings do not confer a clear image of the effectiveness of power sharing. The African experience with Arend Lijphart's four main ingredients of consociational democracy-often wrongly said to be identical to the main devices in diplomatic approaches to power-sharing arrangements in peace agreements-is summarized. Experiences are ambivalent. The paper then concentrates on recent major African peace agreements (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , detailing their powersharing content in a synopsis. Variations in power-sharing ingredients are important; some cases of "cheap diplomacy" can be detected (for example, Chad), but even "expensive diplomacy" like that in the Comorian case has not resulted in clear success. In a last step, three country cases are analyzed-where necessary-over a longer time period: Côte d'Ivoire (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , Liberia (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , and Central African Republic (1996 Republic ( -2007 . The three cases differ in the weight and origin of outside intervention forces and guarantors of peace agreements as well as in the actual quality of power-sharing devices. The conclusion focuses on the factors of failure of peace agreements that place a heavy emphasis on power sharing.
Sustainable Peace by Peace Agreements?
There is a large and growing body of literature on the causes of successful conflict resolution. It would be impossible to give an account of all arguments put forward and all approaches followed in this field. Only a selection of the main works will be quoted (selectively) here to underline what kind of question is rarely addressed: those relating to the local level of peace agreements and its nexus with power-sharing formulas contained in peace agreements. Let us consider some major academic contributions to the debate first.
Fen Osler Hampson in his book Nurturing Peace (1996) tests four possible explanations of the success of peace processes: the international support of the peace process; the ripeness of the conflict (following the classical Zartman notion); systemic/regional power balances; and finally the quality of the peace agreement, in particular whether the agreement includes a power-sharing arrangement. As a result of his study Hampson dismisses the "quality argument" on the bases of a five cases comparison (Cyprus, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, Cam-bodia): well-designed agreements would be as prone to failure as badly designed agreements. One critique of Hampson's work is that he fails to consider that civil wars vary enormously in terms of the number of warring parties, the war aims of the parties, levels of death and destruction, the size of the country, etc. and that there would be good reason to suspect that inter alia the quality of design of an agreement may be the product of those and other basic variables (Stedman 2002; 5) . Another obvious critique could be that Hampson only focuses on the "objective" quality of an agreement, but does not analyze whether it is termed acceptable by stakeholders. This quality in turn may be much more a function of who designed it and how acceptable the process of negotiation would be for the warring parties. The quality of an agreement would then be not "objective," but largely "subjective."
However, Hampson's study is of particular interest as he does not stop with the formal signing of a peace agreement in terming a negotiation process a success but rather enlarges the focus to include the implementation phase. His type of structured small-N comparison with a limited number of cases is what is aimed for in this paper as well.
Barbara Walter (1997) , focusing on third-party guarantees as the most salient factor in success nevertheless posits that the more power sharing built into an agreement the less international commitment would be needed. This belief in power sharing as a miracle formula is not rare, but should lead to further questions. What is meant by power sharing? Who has to share power with whom and who can still be excluded from the sharing arrangement? Those questions are essential as power sharing can be limited to only a few areas of governance, as power may be shared between the government and only hand-picked rebel groups, and as radical movements on the one hand, civilian opposition parties on the other, are often left out. Stedman and Rothchild (1996) remind us that the alternative to a weak agreement is often no agreement. It would be all too easy to blame the peace agreement and the mediator who produced it when conflict is reignited in its aftermath. Instead, it would be important to focus on barriers to implementation. Stedman (1997) in a widely quoted article makes a case for focusing on so-called spoilers as the most important barrier to implementation. While
Stedman fortunately brings back in a number of issues of importance such as actors' interests and intents in the discussion and therefore can be seen as an important advocate in being less naïve about peace processes, some critical aspects of his work have to be recorded:
First, by neglecting the quality question in peace agreements spoilers are always portrayed as the "bad guys" as they step out of something that is per se perceived as good-regardless of what harm it does to particular group interests. Secondly, the spoilers of the peace process could have been the defendants of the democratization process earlier; arguably this is the story of the Ivorian students' union Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), a major actor of violence in the latest crisis (Konaté 2003) . Or a rebel movement that is accommodated by a peace process and apparently sticking better to the provisions of the peace agreement than the government may have been the spoiler of earlier reforms. And is it correct to see the Front Patriotique Ivoirien (FPI), President Gbagbo's political party, in Côte d'Ivoire as the main spoiler of peace? Briefly in power (and, according to the party itself, pursuing a reform agenda) before being menaced by semi-successful rebels, it was subsequently more active in "spoiling" the existing peace process which was seen as unjust and imposed from outside (see below). The spoiler perspective may hide more than it can reveal.
Finally, Stedman (2002; 13) -surprisingly for a social scientist-asserts that "our attempts to assess the intent and motivation of parties during peace implementation must rest on intelligence, not indicators" and that motives for noncompliance should be assessed "through intelligence, informants, surveillance, and reading of documents" (ibid.). Not only is he dismissing all local knowledge, he also simply ignores all preexisting analysis on the social basis of actors assembled by different disciplines and local sources beyond "informants.". This is hardly acceptable for area studies specialists with an in-depth knowledge of societies based on long-term observation as it should be for all social scientists using different quantitative or qualitative methods of information gathering.
Quantitative analysis exists in peace research. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) have tested a good number of variables that may increase the likelihood of war termination through negotiation using a dataset of civil wars since 1945. They could come up with a number of robust statistical results that show that some factors provide for an easier (existence of treaties, of a UN peace mission, precedence of a long and costly war) or more difficult environment (identity war, widespread human misery, high number of factions, natural resource dependence) for implementation of peace settlements. That the mere existence of peace agreements would make a difference comes as a surprise. The quality and the form of power-sharing agreements are not taken into account in their hypotheses. Hoddie and Hartzell (2005: 83) use power sharing in a broader sense than others, also involving informal rules and not only constitutional dispositions. Additionally, in their study they use not institutions as an independent variable (for explaining the durability of peace), but dispositions in the peace agreement-whether implemented or not. And they distinguish between different levels of power sharing: a) central (political), b) territorial (federalism/decentralization), c) military, and d) economic power sharing. Consecutive hypotheses are formulated and statistically tested. Their conclusion is positive while differentiated:
"Power sharing provisions in peace settlements have a demonstrated ability to provide a sense of security to former combatants facing the immediate prospect of working together peacefully after a severe conflict such as a civil war" (103). One only wonders how they could come to this conclusion without asking the combatants. They continue "In particular, our research indicates that both military and territorial power sharing have a positive role to play in fostering post-war peace" (103). Again, this seems a premature conclusion at least for the aspect of territorial power sharing, when applied to the African cases. Onwar.com) . This is hardly convincing as turns of low-intensity conflicts frequently do not make it to the attention of international media.
As a strong critique of "liberal Peace-building" Paris (1997 Paris ( , 2004 claims that implementers of peace agreements often exacerbate already existing divisions in societies. Outsiders that impose democracy or liberal economy at the end of a civil war and then quickly leave would lend a dangerous service to war-torn societies by generating a number of destabilizing side effects. Paris' high standards for success may be a problem in his analysis, as some of his failures would not be termed such by other authors (Stedman 2002, 19) , but he may also be one-sided in believing that the normative orientation of outsiders would be in opposition to (all) local actors. Democracy and liberal economy may not be so controversial in all world regions (for example, in Africa south of the Sahara) as it might be in the Arab world. However, what is important in Paris' perspective is the pin-pointing of the not so neutral or innocent role of mediators and peacekeepers. Tull and Mehler (2005: 375) argue that the unsteady support for democracy in Africa from
Western donors and the enhanced international standing of armed movements in the post-1989 period have induced would-be leaders to conquer state power by violent rather than civilian means:
This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western efforts to solve violent conflict through power-sharing agreements. The hypothesis is put forward that the institutionalisation of this practice for the sake of "peace", i.e. providing rebels with a share of state power, has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, power-sharing agreements contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence. This is shown by recalling some recent peace settlements in Africa (Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad).
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Roeder (2005) is one of those authors who advocate a liberal solution to conflicts. He criticizes power-sharing formulas and puts forward his notion of "power dividing." By this notion he means a combination of tamed executive, checks and balances on all levels, putting the rights of the individual before the rights of groups, etc., in practice: a liberal democracy.
His own statistical test supports his claim, and he concludes, "The argument is that liberalism is also realism" (80). What might get lost in this argumentation is that a full transition to liberalism is not in all cases realistic.
In sum, power sharing has found support and critique in the academic debate on peace agreements, but maybe this depends too much of the individual researchers' understanding of the concept itself. It therefore makes sense to have a second look on what the classical author on the topic had in mind. Admittedly, power sharing in peace agreements has a less "preventive" character as intended when power sharing is an ingredient of institutionbuilding in a less conflictive situation.
What Lijphart's Classical Study Tells Us-and Doesn't Tell Us-about African Cases
The defendants of power-sharing arrangements as the core element of postconflict peace frequently base their arguments on the work of the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart on consociational democracy (Lemarchand 2007) . They claim that power sharing would essentially help to avoid secession and bring more fertile solutions to conflicts in plural societies. The claims of ethnic and other parts of society could be integrated into institutional arrangements which would in turn guarantee a meaningful participation in political power.
This would avoid more costly alternatives of a fully fledged war. "Spheres of autonomy" for the identified groups would be a necessity as would be proportional representation and veto We were criticized by Lemarchand (2007) for allegedly not wanting to take into account rebel organization's grievances, in particular those that were excluded and had spoiling capacities. This was not our argument, as we primarily wanted to show that peace agreements fail to take into account civilian opposition's grievances voiced in peace time and end up in sidelining those more constructive forces.
rights. This may sound convincing in the first place. Who would not like to avoid victims and terminate wars around the globe-as easy as by adjusting institutional design?
But let us consider first, again in some detail, the essentials of Lijphart's model of consociational democracy (1977):
1) The main element of consociational democracy is the broad-based grand coalition including political parties not needed to form a majority.
2) Minority veto: Minorities in existential danger can veto important decisions leading to new negotiations on the consensus mode.
3) Proportional representation in providing for all major political and administrative positions and in the distribution of public means.
4) Group autonomy, that is, all decisions of superior national interest are taken on the central level by the grand coalition. But those with less outreach and concerning just the context of the autonomous group, are dealt with in geographically limited entities (this can be implemented best in a federal system).
Let us first reflect the African experience with these elements:
The government of national unity, very familiar to Africa since the 1960s, comes immediately to mind when evoking a grand coalition (Rothchild/Foley 1988) . The African experience with this instrument is ambivalent, as it might have avoided severe conflicts in some states but also precluded democracy in others.
2 Over-sized governments are not rare while the forced inclusion of smaller partners can be encountered, starting with some less than voluntary formations of unified parties in the 1960s. Above all, coalition agreements were rarely enacted by party congresses, but just signed by party leaders, the followers get ditched in this process (arguably the history of RENAMO in Mozambique).
The minority veto is a rarely established feature in African constitutions. This by no means tells us something about real, but often discrete, veto players in African polities-very often the military hierarchy, sometimes traditional kings, and in some places religious leaders. Lijphart (1977: 38) himself writes that the minority veto can be an informal and unwritten understanding. In the case of Burundi, the Tutsi minority had the "ultimate" veto in form of the monopoly on military power (Sullivan 2005: 88) . As Sullivan notes, it was "the threat of losing that ultimate veto which caused it to be used, thus ending the attempt at peace" (ibid.).
Proportional representation (beyond legislative elections) has also rarely made its entry into an (Mehler 2002) . Decentralization as the currently most common translation of the "group autonomy" ingredient of power sharing in Africa can only have a positive effect when the following questions can be answered positively:
-Does decentralization contribute significantly to reduce structural disparities between groups in conflict, especially the more equitable distribution of public goods and services? Or does it exacerbate such disparities? Note that better-off local and regional units may be in a better position to profit from such a reform.
-Does decentralization further or obstruct the formation of autonomous spheres of power outside official or oppositional organizations? Note that decentralization may transport conflict from the central to the local level and create incentives to reduce a preexisting informal autonomy.
-Does decentralization enhance or undermine the ability of local actors to promote crisis prevention and reconciliation? Note that the ability of central actors (including police, the National Assembly) to do so probably will be reduced and need to be matched.
-Does decentralization allow for revenues from resources localized in a particular region to be shared on an acceptable basis for both the local entity and the society as a whole?
The rather young experience with decentralization has not yet allowed to draw robust con- Rothchild argument), while a consolidated constitution then took away some of the aspects of formal power sharing. Roeder and Rothchild (2005: 12) view the intrinsic dilemma of power-sharing arrangements in the contradictions between the immediate inclusionary strategy in a first phase of getting a peace agreement and the long-term institutional arrangements in a later phase. Walter (2002) shows that power-sharing pacts are likely to be unstable over time and concludes that "a second transition will almost certainly be needed to maintain peace over the long term" (167). It is, however, obvious that it could be very difficult to get from phase 1 to phase 2 with the personnel and the transitional institutions of phase 1 carrying with them all their interests to maintain status and privileges. Doubts are permitted that mediators even think in this long-term perspective. This may not be blamed entirely on the acting persons since the challenges are often immense. One key problem of the fire department diplomacy that is more typical to Africa than any tailor-made solution is the right choice of mediation partners on the rebel side. -In a context devoid of peace, maybe with a record of only manipulated elections over decades, it is very difficult to know who can command loyalty and legitimacy of specific groups.
-The assumption is much more realistic that the self-declared leaders and representatives of a neglected group are rather politico-military entrepreneurs without a genuine interest in representing something beyond themselves. They are usually selected as negotiation partners for their spoiling capacities.
-The groups to be represented are usually designed as ethnic groups while they will only rarely form an undisputed entity. The outer limits of these groups are in fact frequently disputed and the internal homogeneity is a fiction. Very often, the "ethnogenesis" of those groups have not yet come to an end in contrast to conflicts that were frozen for centuries. Under these circumstances it also becomes completely unclear, which institutions should guarantee group interests.
Over recent decades a good number of peace settlements were agreed upon in the name of preventive diplomacy whose sustainability could have been doubted early on. Roeder and Partly, it was feared that the maintenance of privileges such as enjoying first-class hotels and food in foreign capitals, would motivate this behavior. Other doubts were voiced about the early exclusion of so-called "negative forces," in particular Hutu extremists (Lemarchand 2007: 9) . In the case of Burundi the military weakening of Hutu rebels in parallel with a political weakening of the Tutsi establishment over the years of inconclusive negotiation had certainly as much weight as a success factor as the substance of what was on the negotiation table. While both countries still struggle to gain a respectable level of stability we can at least say that a hasty procedure was avoided. The 'cheap diplomacy' label may not be justified.
However, it is a problematic legacy of the last years that the most important civil political parties of the 1990s (in both countries) have become a shadow of themselves. This is true for Burundi and in particular for the victorious party in the 1993 elections. The This also meant that Lijphart's ideas about consociational democracy were not unknown to a number of stakeholders and mediators. Typically, a strong emphasis on minority rights for Tutsi was encapsulated in the Burundian Constitution of 1992 and the preceding Charta of National Unity (1991) (Mehler 1994 ). At least in name, the peace agreement between central government and southern rebels in Sudan is a comprehensive one (Mattes 2006) . The agreement did nothing to stop-some would say it even contributed to-the new bloody conflict in Darfur that at least resembles genocide (Woodward 2006: 177) . The nonassociation of other conflict zones in Sudan (and other local rebel movements) must be termed problematic as the "national cake" (that is, oil from South Sudan and top positions in the state apparatus) was already shared between two partners. 9 It may also turn out to be problematic that the very name of the "Comprehensive
Peace Agreement" (CPA) tends to ignore the continuing heterogeneity of the South Sudanese rebels. So is the CPA a success? For the time being it may better be termed an agreement with ambivalent outcome.
The paradox of inclusion is an aspect that needs to be highlighted here. In numerous cases
around Africa the inclusion of one rebel group in a peace agreement and subsequently in a power-sharing government left others excluded, who could here find an incentive to strengthen their war efforts-in order to be included at the next stage. This may undermine the sustainability of peace. What this involves for democracy has been shown above for Burundi and DR Congo: moderate civilian parties are more easily excluded from these deals and scarcely receive international attention (Tull/Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2006 ).
What makes peace agreements successful? It looks very arbitrary to give out time frames of the type already described: after x months of nonrecurrence of violence, 10 or when in a second escalation the magical 1,000 battle-deaths threshold was not crossed. After all, peace is when people think they are at peace. The perceptions of the population are the best indicator of successful and failing peace settlements. But these data are missing and are usually not generated. In its absence, I have opted for including agreements as successes when the same actors or their proxies/successors did not fight each other until early December 2007, as failures when they or their proxies/successors did and as ambivalent cases when the outcome was unclear or contributed to the escalation of a different conflict.
Before moving to the three cases where an in-depth analysis is proposed (Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic) let us get an overview of recent African cases (south of the Sahara) of peace agreements and their power-sharing content (see Table 1 ).
This overview shows that power sharing was a prominent aspect of most recent African peace settlements. The big exception is obviously the Casamance conflict between separatist rebels and the central government of Senegal. Here, numerous peace agreements have failed to have any sustainable effects. It would be still risky to blame this on the absence of any 9
The failure of peace negotiations for Darfur is well described in a detailed way by an insider in Alex de Waal: I will not sign, London Review of Books, www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n23/waal01_.html (access December 11, 2007) . Another result of this overview is that there are important variations in the form power sharing can take. Even more striking is the variation in the important question of who is sharing power with whom. Obviously, only those present at the negotiation table could really count on being included in major ways. The civil war had a clear winner: President Sassou Nguesso. This ceasefire agreement with one rebel organization was followed by a "national dialogue without exclusion" (which, nevertheless, the main exiled politicians did not take part in) and resulted in a meaningless "convention nationale Both recent peace agreements for Chad listed here are extremely vague (texts available via the homepage of the prime minister of Chad, www.primature-tchad.org (access November 12, 2007) . They stand out for their character of integrating former rebel combatants in the national army in exchange for stopping hostilities and disarmament. This is a common feature of older rebellions in Chad when rebel leaders negotiated their personal entry into the government plus the integration of some of their loyal followers in the national army. This has never lead to sustainable peace, but rather created incentives for others to start new rebellions. The most recent agreement was worth only the paper it was written on only one month after having been signed. It looks premature to identify success factors from this compilation. In Angola, the govern- As will be shown, Liberia can be seen as a special case where the power sharing itself was far from ideal, but the large peacekeeping mission permitted to quickly come to "phase 2" of the transition and provided a sense of security.
Some of the ambivalent cases and the outright failures also provide lessons: Superficial negotiations à la Chad will not bring peace one step closer. In the case of Sierra Leone, it was not the peace agreement, but rather enforced peace by-mainly British-intervention forces that was the key to a late success.
Let us now turn to our three case-studies and the respective power-sharing formulas con- But there are also differences, the most important one being that the crises of two countries received relatively strong international attention, including the search for peace agreements, but also translated into strong UN engagements-Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire-while the CAR only entered the international agenda seriously after the Darfur crisis in 2006. Before, peacemaking and peacekeeping was more or less left to the former colonizer France and local allies. The "international engagement factor" in peacemaking and security provision can be analyzed with CAR being the control case for the two other cases. But France was also very active in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire. Liberia may help to depict the weight of the "French factor" (or former colonizer factor).
It may be noted that in all those crises a high number of additional conflict management initiatives were undertaken, inter alia via sanctions by both the African Union and the UN Security
Council or by on-the-spot mediation by UN representatives. The latter could contain proposals for power sharing. Not all of them could be taken into account in the following analysis.
Côte d'Ivoire
For decades Côte d'Ivoire was a show-case of superficial stability and positive economic development. In the 1990s the country gradually entered a slippery slope (Akindès 2004 ). This was intrinsically linked to a failed democratization process in the 1990s. Manipulated elections (1990, 1995) , a problematic succession after the death of founding father Félix
Houphouët-Boigny to his favorite Henri Konan Bédié, economic crisis and the growing polarization between North and South led to the "Christmas coup" in 1999. The following elections were held without the participation of Bédié and Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister who had created his own party Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and was consistently sidelined in elections since 1995 for his alleged foreign origins (Burkina Faso).
The RDR was considered a regionalist party addressing northern grievances (citizens of "second rank"-linked to the radical "Ivoirité" ideology, harassment by the security forces, etc.). All those reforms would have needed a change of constitution. There is no doubt that some of those solutions were not full-heartedly supported by all those who signed the agreement. But two other facts were causes for the ultimate failure of the agreement: a) the role of France as a patronizing mediator and b) the following power-sharing formula imposed shortly afterwards at the so-called Kléber meeting in the conference center of the same name in the French capital. It was simply unacceptable to Abidjan (and particularly in the army leadership) that the rebels should get the Defence and the Interior portfolio, ministries that would give them preponderance in all security issues. The preceding step, to make the rebels presentable by inviting them all to negotiations in Marcoussis, was already difficult to bear for some hardliners of the regime and indeed gave them a political weight they previously did not have. While Bédié, Ouattara and Soro were all present in person, Gbagbo let himself be represented by party chairman Affi Nguessan. In Abidjan, violent demonstrations erupted, French interests were particularly targeted. Soon, Gbagbo declared that he would make all constitutional amendments conditional on their approval by referendum. Not only would a referendum be difficult to hold over the entire territory, but also, Gbagbo felt that he would be in a position to control the outcome. In fact, the presidential camp had distanced itself immediately from the agreement upon the delegation's return to Abidjan, declaring the text a simple draft needing refinement. Therefore, the whole agreement-despite its interesting ingredients-had from the onset very bad The other main points were the immediate ending of violence on the entire territory, disarmament of all militias, implementation of the DDR process, training of 600 rebels in view of their later integration, return of all rebel ministers to the government of national reconciliation, reform of the electoral commission, some parliamentary homework on reform laws, extension of a state subsidy to political parties including parties not represented in parliament. 
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The Forces Nouvelles refused the South African Mediation after it declared that Gbagbo had fulfilled his part of the obligations. A media battle followed. came as a shock and was attributed to different potential spoilers of the peace process. 
Liberia 24
A first civil war started in 1989 with the politico-military entrepreneur Charles Taylor Korte (1997: 62) notes, it was the first time that warlords were nominated representatives of an institution that should be responsible for defending state interests against fellow warlords and intervention forces. According to observers, it was even more worrying than the distribution of political positions that each warring faction was given key public corporations which would allow them to siphon off state resources and thereby fund whatever they please (ICG 2003: 4f) . This annex is indeed sharing the spoils between the warring parties at a ratio of four state corporations to each warring party and two national agencies to each warring party.
The power sharing involved in the Accra Agreement has been heavily criticized. In the view of Amos Sawyer (2004: 454) , "fixing the central state is important but insufficient. (…) Authority must be constitutionally shared at other levels of government and local people must become empowered participants." The security architecture proposed by Sawyer would be organized across borders and involve, where appropriate, religious bodies and community militia units. This seems plausible as numerous local-based ethnic disputes have fuelled the civil war at the national level. Liberia's history of externally brokered agreements is plenty of power-sharing devices involving the top level of warring parties. Only the strong and active presence of international peacekeepers achieved a respectable degree of stability and security-and not the power sharing during the transition period.
Central African Republic
From 1996 It is important to recognizes that these conflicts-and equally as important, the character of their resolution-had certain very negative effects on the political climate in the countryeffects that undermined the subsequent prospects for both democracy and the preservation of civil peace. The activities of international actors-despite good intentions-effectively had contributed to the poisoning of the political environment.
In the first place, the character of conflict settlements, as promoted by international actors, amplified the tension between the principle of accommodation and the practice of exclusionary and privatized politics. International actors continuously asked for a broader representation of the radical and partly violent opposition in government. And at some point, something close to the objective was achieved: The mutinies of 1996/97 led to the inclusion of some rebel leaders in governmental responsibility as brokered by UN and other mediators. Patassé also felt compelled to include some opposition members in his government, but he was able to hand-pick which members would be included.
Thus, what appears to have occurred with these conflict settlements was a temporary and cosmetic acceptance of inclusive politics, resulting largely from international pressure. The practice of inclusion did not however result in any real participation in the decision-making process, and indeed seemed to involve more of an extension of rents to those elites with the power to disrupt civil peace. That the national assembly later decided to attribute substantial pensions to former presidents Dacko and Kolingba (October 30, 1997) serves as testimony to this. Such pensions were clearly a bonus for renunciation of violence.
In the second place, a dangerous precedent was established in the resolution of these conflicts.
A lesson learnt by local actors was that the threat of violence could be instrumentalized to get material rewards. For example, the rebels were immediately accepted as a negotiation partner and concessions were made quickly-much more quickly than to the civilian opposition. Ex-erting violence proved a means to garner international attention, which, at least at first sight, proved rewarding. One message emanating from this situation was that those losing out in the redistribution of sinecures should retain their capacity to sustain conflicts (inter alia arms).
This would preserve their capacity to come back to the "dining room" (Mehler 1999) . While the UFDR rebels asked for negotiations under international mediation, Bozizé was more than reluctant. The only noteworthy signal was when the head of state held a one-day forum in the National Assembly on July 28 as a limited form of dialogue with all "vibrant parts of the society," during which he at least did not rule out direct talks with rebels. The meeting was snubbed by several opposition leaders.
Cooperation with France intensified after the rebel conquest of northern towns in November. In a dramatic radio message, the government appealed to the international community and "friendly nations, in particular those linked by specific treaties, particularly France, to work for the restoration of the territorial integrity." The response was immediate. France used six Mirage fighter jets to combat rebels in accordance with the military pact linking both countries. About 300 French soldiers took part in the operation. A week later, Birao was recaptured with massive French help, and the other towns soon followed. The extreme vulnerability of the regime was laid bare by these events. Nine years after the closure of its two military bases in CAR, France was back. Benin were promised to profit from an amnesty if they would accept the deal (they did not).
On 
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The CAR experience with power sharing stands out for having been very reluctantly engaged in by the heads of state (Patassé and Bozizé), 41 because the details of the dialogue process were criticized by the civilian opposition, and because the overall limited achievements did not help in bringing about more security for ordinary people.
Although all three cases differ in the form civil war has taken, there is one striking commonality: the readiness of the international community to advocate or facilitate a strong powersharing ingredient of peace agreements and this to the benefit of armed rebel movements (or their leaders). This seems not to be a function of the strength of international engagement, as power sharing could be a cheap solution (CAR) or a rather expensive and transitional one It would be useful to apply the game-theoretical model of Addison and Murshed (2002) to the CAR case. Here the loss of reputation by cheating previous peace agreements has important explanatory power for the readiness to conclude of the other conflict party and the sustainability of the following agreements. The reputation of both Patassé and Bozizé as reliable partners in peace agreements must be regarded as low as both have stepped out of their promises repeatedly.
(Liberia). Liberia has made it to "phase 2" of a peace process, not without difficulties and not without strong external engagement. Building solid institutions, not least in the justice sector will be crucial if "peace should be won. 
Conclusion
Although some positive effects of power sharing can be assumed to have resulted from some recent peace agreements as previous grievances are addressed, the existing critique on power sharing as an impediment to sustainable peace is largely supported by this paper's analysis. Additionally, the potential long-term negative consequences of power sharing on democracy can be detected in some of the cases (Mehler/Tull 2005 , Jarstad 2006 . Examining a full sample of recent African cases from 1999 onwards ( Table 1) 2) The second problematic aspect of the settlement practice is the systematic assumption that the conflict is ethnopolitical in nature (particularly when it comes to Africa). While Burundi's civil war has an obvious ethnic coloration and significance, this is much more difficult to assert for, for example, Comoros, Liberia, and Central African Republic (more obviously: center-periphery domination), with Côte d'Ivoire being a rather complicated case where region, religion, and also generation play important roles in defining the salient cleavages.
3) The local level not only of a) conflict generation and b) escalation, but also of c) conflict management and d) security production is more often than not completely neglected in peace negotiations. The importance of this level in all four respects is thus neglected. National power sharing cannot bring a solution at the local level and may even impede local solutions to problems that were at the root of an armed conflict. terms-and when proposals should be drawn from such an analysis-this probably calls for a) more weight for multitrack diplomacy (Miall 2004) , not only in Sri Lanka and the Balkans but also in Africa, and b) critical attention to local security provision as part of peace agreements. After all, only tailor-made, intensely debated, and maybe only transitional powersharing arrangements can have beneficial effects. Such effects will by no means automatically arrive when a peace agreement has been signed.
